The Great Leap Forward & Its Real, Devastating Famine

Chinese Political History I: Empire's Fall, Revolution & Mao's China

Chapter 8 · The Great Leap Forward & Its Real, Devastating Famine

Chapter 7 closed with the Anti-Rightist Campaign's own real crackdown barely finished — roughly 400,000 people already punished for speaking too openly. Barely a year later, Mao launched an even more ambitious and, ultimately, far more catastrophic project: a campaign to force China's entire economy through a single, compressed leap into industrial modernity.

Mao's Real Goal

The Great Leap Forward officially began at a January 1958 meeting in Nanjing, launched with a genuinely sweeping ambition — transforming China from an agrarian society into an industrialized one within a single generation. Mao's own stated goal was strikingly direct: China would "catch up with and surpass the most powerful capitalist countries in several dozen years."

Backyard Steel Furnaces

Central to that ambition was a real, nationwide steel production drive. August 1958 Politburo meetings set a target to double national steel output within a single year, with much of the planned increase coming not from industrial plants but from millions of small, improvised backyard furnaces — a deliberate attempt to boost production without the capital investment real industrial infrastructure would have required. The campaign hit its own headline number: national steel production reached the targeted 10.7 million tons in 1958. But the real quality of that output told a different story — more than 3 million tons of it turned out to be entirely unusable, produced by untrained villagers smelting whatever metal they could find, including household tools and cookware, in furnaces never capable of producing genuine industrial-grade steel.

Communes Replace Private Farming

Agriculture underwent an equally sweeping transformation. By 1958, private land ownership had been abolished outright, and households across the countryside were compelled into large, state-operated communes that replaced the smaller cooperative structures land reform had built barely five years earlier, banning private farming entirely. Roughly 25,000 communes were established by year's end, averaging some 5,000 households apiece — a real, massive reorganization of rural Chinese life carried out in a matter of months.

Grain Exports Continue Amid Starvation

Exports continued even as the countryside starved Despite real, widespread starvation spreading through rural China, the country continued exporting substantial quantities of grain throughout 1958–1960, maintaining international appearances even as its own population went hungry. U.S. President Kennedy publicly noted that China continued sending food to Africa and Cuba during the very crisis killing its own citizens, while the government simultaneously refused foreign offers of famine aid — a real, documented choice to preserve political image over feeding a starving population.

The Real, Disputed Death Toll

The famine's own real human cost, like the land reform death toll traced in Chapter 7, is genuinely disputed rather than settled to a single figure — scholarly estimates range from 15 million to as many as 55 million deaths. A widely cited estimate places the real toll at roughly 30 million, a figure that would make the Great Leap famine potentially the deadliest famine recorded anywhere in human history.

The 1959 Lushan Conference & Peng Dehuai's Purge

Real criticism of the campaign reached the very top of the Party leadership within a year of its launch. Marshal Peng Dehuai, China's own Minister of National Defense, openly raised concerns about the Great Leap's own early, damaging impact at the 1959 Lushan Conference. Mao's response was swift and severe: Peng was dismissed outright, and Mao launched the "Anti-Right Deviation Struggle" in direct response, purging over 3 million Party members or sympathizers across the country. Lin Biao, Peng's replacement as defense minister, moved to systematically remove Peng's own remaining military supporters from positions of influence.

Finding: a second, related instance of the same pattern Peng Dehuai's real punishment for raising genuine, well-founded concerns through his own official channels is a direct continuation of the pattern Chapter 7 already flagged — criticism, even when offered through entirely legitimate means by a senior, loyal official, met real, severe retaliation rather than genuine engagement. Where the Anti-Rightist Campaign had targeted intellectuals who spoke up after an explicit invitation to do so, Lushan shows the same underlying intolerance for dissent extending even to a trusted, high-ranking military leader who had never been formally invited to criticize anything at all.

Retreat & Aftermath

The famine's own scale eventually forced a real policy reversal. The Ninth Plenum, held in early 1961, marked a genuine shift toward "adjustment, consolidation, filling out, and improvement," rolling back several of the Great Leap's own most extreme measures. The decisive moment came at the 1962 Seven Thousand Cadres Conference, where Mao genuinely ceded day-to-day economic leadership to more pragmatic figures — Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping — beginning a real period of economic readjustment, even as Mao himself maintained publicly that the Great Leap's own basic direction could not be fundamentally challenged.

That partial retreat from front-line leadership did not mark the end of Mao's own political ambitions. Chapter 9 traces what followed once Mao judged the moment right to reassert control — the Cultural Revolution, and the real, brutal power struggle it unleashed across the entire party and country.

Hands-On Exercises

Exercise 1

Explain why the backyard furnace campaign's own headline success (hitting the 10.7 million ton steel target) is a misleading measure of whether the campaign actually achieved its real goal.

Exercise 2

Explain why continuing grain exports during a famine is real, meaningful evidence about the government's own priorities, rather than simply a tragic coincidence of bad timing.

Exercise 3

Explain why Peng Dehuai's purge at Lushan represents a genuinely more severe version of the pattern already seen in the Anti-Rightist Campaign, rather than simply a repeat of the same thing.

Quick Reference

  • January 1958: the Great Leap Forward launches at a meeting in Nanjing, aiming to industrialize China within a single generation
  • Backyard furnaces: hit the 10.7-million-ton steel target, but over 3 million tons of that output was entirely unusable
  • Communes: ~25,000 established by end of 1958, averaging ~5,000 households, replacing private farming outright
  • 1958–1960: China continues exporting grain to Africa and Cuba, and refuses foreign famine aid, even as mass starvation spreads domestically
  • Real, disputed death toll: scholarly estimates range from 15 million to 55 million; ~30 million is a widely cited figure
  • 1959 Lushan Conference: Peng Dehuai is purged for criticizing the campaign; the Anti-Right Deviation Struggle that follows purges over 3 million more
  • 1962 Seven Thousand Cadres Conference: Mao cedes day-to-day economic leadership to Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping while maintaining the Great Leap's basic direction couldn't be challenged