The Long March & the Rise of Mao Zedong

Chinese Political History I: Empire's Fall, Revolution & Mao's China

Chapter 5 · The Long March & the Rise of Mao Zedong

Chapter 4 closed with the Nanchang Uprising's own defeated survivors eventually joining a separate communist base area building in Jiangxi province. This chapter traces what became of that base — its own real destruction by Nationalist forces, the desperate retreat it forced, and the real, gradual process by which one of its leaders, Mao Zedong, rose to command the movement itself.

The Jiangxi Soviet & Chiang's Fifth Encirclement Campaign

By the early 1930s, communist forces had built a genuine, functioning base of territorial control in Jiangxi province — the Jiangxi Soviet. Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government launched a series of military campaigns to destroy it, and the fifth of these proved decisive. Rather than pursuing open battle, Chiang's forces adopted a real, methodical strategy of constructing an interlocking network of blockhouses that steadily tightened around the Soviet's own territory, cutting off supply and movement. The strategy worked: within months, Nationalist forces had captured several of the Communists' own major strongholds, leaving the Jiangxi Soviet's own survival genuinely untenable.

The Breakout Begins

Facing annihilation, the Communist leadership ordered a real, large-scale breakout. The retreat officially began on 16 October 1934, when roughly 130,000 soldiers and civilians departed Jiangxi. Not everyone who set out completed the initial breakout itself — more than 86,000 troops, alongside roughly 11,000 administrative personnel and thousands of civilian porters, actually made it through the Nationalist encirclement in the campaign's own earliest, most dangerous phase.

A Real, Disputed Distance

The Long March's own popular reputation rests heavily on a specific figure — 25,000 li, roughly 12,500 kilometers — but the real, actual distance travelled is genuinely disputed by historians rather than settled fact.

Even Mao's own account isn't internally consistent Mao himself is credited with the famous 25,000-li figure, yet his own 1935 poem about the march instead states 20,000 li — roughly 10,000 kilometers, a real, meaningful discrepancy in Mao's own telling. A 2006 investigation by British researchers, physically retracing plausible march routes, estimated the true distance at closer to 6,000 kilometers — under half the popularly cited figure. Chinese sources have disputed that lower estimate in turn, maintaining the First Red Army's own march covered closer to 18,088 li. No single, universally agreed distance actually exists — a genuine reminder that the Long March's own legendary status has shaped how its concrete details are remembered, not just how the story is told.

Whatever its own exact length, the route itself was real and genuinely grueling — a sweeping arc through Hunan, Guizhou, Sichuan, and Yunnan, crossing major rivers and mountain passes, before finally reaching Shaanxi in the north.

The Real, Catastrophic Cost

The march's own human cost was severe by any measure. Of an initial force of roughly 100,000 troops, fewer than 7,000 of the original soldiers reached the final destination in the north — with total survivors, including later reinforcements and additions along the route, numbering around 8,000 by the time the main force reached Yan'an. The wider Communist Party itself contracted sharply over the same period, with total membership falling from roughly 300,000 to around 40,000. These losses came from a real combination of causes — fatigue, hunger, cold, sickness, desertion, and outright military casualties — rather than any single catastrophic battle.

The Zunyi Conference (15–17 January 1935)

Partway through the retreat, CCP leadership convened the Zunyi Conference, a real and genuinely pivotal turning point for Mao's own political fortunes. Mao had been sidelined into a largely figurehead role within the party leadership before the conference; at Zunyi, seventeen of the meeting's twenty participants argued in his favor, and the Soviet-backed leadership of Bo Gu and the Comintern military adviser Otto Braun faced severe, direct criticism for the strategic failures that had led to the Jiangxi Soviet's own loss.

Finding: Mao's rise was real, but genuinely gradual, not instantaneous Zunyi did not hand Mao supreme authority outright. In its own immediate aftermath, Zhou Enlai was empowered to make final military decisions, with Mao positioned as his assistant rather than as sole commander. Mao's own full consolidation of leadership came only later — in November 1935, shortly after the march's main force had settled in northern Shaanxi, Mao officially took over Zhou Enlai's own leading position. The popular image of Zunyi as the single moment Mao seized total control flattens a real process that actually took nearly a full year to complete.

Consolidation at Yan'an

The First Front Army reached Yan'an, in Shaanxi province, on 19 October 1935, giving the battered Communist movement a real, defensible new base far from Chiang's own reach. The march's own formal conclusion came later still — the Second Red Army did not reach the final rendezvous point until 22 October 1936, marking the real union of all three surviving Red Army forces and the Long March's own official end.

Whatever its own real, catastrophic cost, the retreat achieved something genuinely strategic: it gave the CCP the geographic isolation it needed to recuperate, rebuild, and reorganize in the north, and it left Mao Zedong in a position of real, consolidated leadership that would shape the party's own direction for the following decades. Chapter 6 picks up directly from Yan'an, tracing the real Second United Front against Japanese invasion, the resumed civil war against the KMT once that threat passed, and the Communist Party's own real 1949 victory.

Hands-On Exercises

Exercise 1

Explain why Chiang Kai-shek's blockhouse strategy against the Jiangxi Soviet was more effective than the Nationalists' earlier encirclement campaigns had been, based on what the strategy actually did differently.

Exercise 2

Explain why the genuine disagreement among historians over the Long March's own real distance doesn't actually undermine the significance of the march itself.

Exercise 3

Explain why treating the Zunyi Conference as the single moment Mao seized total control is a less accurate account than treating his rise as a process completed only by November 1935.

Quick Reference

  • 16 October 1934: the Long March begins as roughly 130,000 people break out of the collapsing Jiangxi Soviet
  • Distance: genuinely disputed — Mao's own cited 25,000 li vs. his 1935 poem's 20,000 li vs. a 2006 British estimate of ~6,000 km vs. Chinese sources' own ~18,088-li figure
  • Real cost: fewer than 7,000 of the original ~100,000 troops survived to reach the north; total CCP membership fell from ~300,000 to ~40,000
  • 15–17 January 1935: the Zunyi Conference — Mao gains real influence, but Zhou Enlai retains final military authority in the immediate aftermath
  • 19 October 1935: the First Front Army reaches Yan'an, Shaanxi
  • November 1935: Mao formally takes over Zhou Enlai's own leading position, completing his real consolidation of CCP leadership
  • 22 October 1936: the Second Red Army's own arrival marks the Long March's formal end